Time itself, therefore, was the worst enemy of each as its passing demonstrated that neither side was taking the initiative. Into this almost freeze frame stepped de Gaulle the following day. The media coverage was wide ranging yet was beginning to canalize opinion, making it more aware that, whatever it was, something dramatic seemed, this time, to be happening.
Into this strange scene where none of the actors — Army, Government, Opinion — were mobilizing, stepped de Gaulle. We can say outright, therefore, that whatever may have happened subsequently, his own initiative was the product of nothing at all but his own personal gamble, and was initially a series of initiatives almost exclusively discursive that had no substance to them at all, and relied utterly on the perceptions of others of each other and of him , and upon the inaction of others who, like bystanders or a theatre audience, watched him perform. It is clear that a lot of demonstrators saw de Gaulle as their best or only, or only legitimate, way of attaining their aims, even though many pieds-noirs disliked de Gaulle, regarding him as a liberal.
This included Salan.
It is predictable, therefore, that the overall tone of those cartoons dealing with Anglo-French relations has been one of a certain Gallophobia 4. Document No. Vous me direz: Mais je n'ai pas deux cent mille francs sur moi. Marius y alla, et mangea encore plus que la veille. C'est pour sept heures?
It is also true that a tiny group of conspiratorial de Gaulle supporters in Algiers were working overtime, and possibly even prompted Salan to utter these words. It is clear that in such a situation, de Gaulle had to respond, both by what he said and what he did not The Gaullist Settlement and French Politics 15 say. He commented, in fewer than words, that the state had faltered, the people were alienated, the army was in turmoil, and that the country had lost its independence. He added that the political parties were unable to stop the slide to disaster, and that the country had once put its trust in him.
The situation now involved not just the power of the army but the legitimacy of de Gaulle, so that the site of possible legitimacy now involved three places: Algiers, Paris and Colombey. There were to be two more weeks of this gavotte. The immediate effect however was to strengthen opposition to him among politicians, in fact to reverse the developing change in their attitudes. As both vice-premier and leader of the Socialist Party SFIO , he asked de Gaulle via answers to journalists and — significantly in terms of the developing rhetorical matrix of May—June — without consulting his Prime Minister : did de Gaulle recognize the legitimacy of the Pflimlin government?
Would he condemn the Algiers insurrection? And would he, if he, de Gaulle, were himself appointed Prime Minister, observe republican conventions? A weekend of deferred anticipation followed, and on the 19th, in front of the national and international press, with thousands of police and gendarmerie on the streets, limousines arriving and camera bulbs flashing, and in the context of demonstrations and actions by the Communists and the Unions e.
By announcing but deferring his press conference de Gaulle had slowed down the pace of the dramatic unfolding of events, while making the protagonists Paris and Algiers critically dependent upon his awaited words and we have already stated that neither Paris nor Algiers, the first to hide its impotence, the second to hide its aggression, enjoyed or profited from the passing of time itself. He also did the opposite, that is — while bringing himself centre stage — speeded up discussion, debate, activity, and speculation to an extreme level, thus transforming the conditions of subsequent events.
We have The Gaullist Settlement and French Politics 17 seen how opinion was still not politically mobilized, but it is worth noting that in this two-week period sales of portable transistor radios quadrupled. Many had not seen him for years. In compared to January , de Gaulle was a significantly older and more portly man, here in civvies he would soon wear military uniform when visiting Algeria , and he used humour, generosity towards Mollet and others , and a sense of care and concern that are crucial to understanding the unfolding events.
The prevailing virtual notion of violence pervading the events of the previous week was transformed into an easy and friendly exchange. This was the press conference where he asked, to much shared amusement, whether people really thought that at 67 he was going to start a career as a dictator. He acknowledged the concerns of the military without condemning them. We shall come back to this, but can say here that his defence here was, crucially, to stress that the government itself had not condemned outright the military insubordination and its alliance with the civil disobedience.
This conference was a didactic, highly publicized lesson to government by an individual in Paris who was not himself in government.
This kind of thing had never happened in French history. The first was the further legitimation of de Gaulle. The Army seemed now to be in open insubordination, and it was now less likely that the army and police would obey the legitimate government.
Soustelle was like an ambassador for de Gaulle. And they did accelerate. The government in Paris began to take some action: press censorship, moving against MPs who seemed to be involved, and long-awaited constitutional revision in order to set up mechanisms that would strengthen government in times of crisis.
In a sense, countering a military coup with constitutional revision was a clear demonstration of the utter ineffectiveness of the government.
Late in the night of Monday the 26th, de Gaulle and Pflimlin met to discuss the situation. De Gaulle could do no more without either supporting the coup or abandoning his strategic and symbolic advantage by rallying to the defence of the republic he detested. The government seemed to have confirmed both its own powerlessness and his centrality. He too, however, had run out of his own invented time, and therefore would soon face the choice of becoming a Fourth Republic politician or a putschist. What he did, once again, was to perform an act of discourse that, once again, had no base at all in the reality of power, but mercifully for him, did in the perceptions of all the other actors involved.
He simply publicly pretended, after having left his stalemate meeting with Pflimlin, that he was in complete political command, whereas he was not in command of anything at all except perhaps via some of his wilder conspirator lieutenants such as Delbeque a potentially catastrophic coup attempt.
He pretended the opposite: that he commanded republican legitimacy. This symbolic self-depiction would become a national perception once his own self-legitimizing had been transferred to the level of the whole polity. This was all the more impressive given that he had no power in either camp. Once again, the politicians reacted against de Gaulle. The socialists voted a motion of to three against him. Such reactions again increased not his immediate legitimacy but his symbolic presence. All the left wing organizations followed suit, and on the next day, Wednesday, a rally of between a quarter and half a million marched in Paris against the putschists.
For some, though not all, it was also a demonstration against de Gaulle. And the vacation of power was increased on the same day as the demonstration against the putschists because Pflimlin resigned along with his whole government. De Gaulle met in secret, this time with the Presidents of the Assembly and Senate but, as with Pflimlin, there was no outcome. He decided to call de Gaulle himself to be appointed as Prime Minister and form a government.
Alain Peyrefitte a pu mener jusqu'au terme sa tâche de mémorialiste du général de Gaulle. Il y tenait d'autant plus qu'il fut, dans ces trois années C'était de Gaulle, tome 3 [Alain Peyrefitte] on packdestmakhli.cf *FREE* shipping on qualifying offers. Alain Peyrefitte a pu mener jusqu'au terme sa tâche de.
He threatened to resign if this did not happen. De Gaulle of course accepted, and proceeded in an utterly Fourth Republic manner to meet all the party leaders except the communists and establish a government that included all the party bigwigs, appointing Mollet, Pinay, Pflimlin and others, and not appointing Soustelle at this point — and when he did, not for long. To have turned an almost totally hostile political class into a largely sympathetic one in the space of a week was astonishing.
And over the next three days with three more majority votes, de Gaulle got everything he had ever wanted: special powers to deal with the Algerian crisis, the right to rule by decree on all but the most fundamental rights and liberties and electoral law for a period of six months, and the right to draw up a new constitution.
How had all this been possible? If we can answer that question it will help us understand the nature of the republic that was coming into being. Understanding the new republic France in was a rapidly changing society. Based upon an economic boom that had been going on for over ten years and would continue for nearly another 20, although it is true that was not without economic difficulties ,17 the late s were witness to rapid social and economic change. This socially, culturally and economically rich context was the paradoxical setting for a government in paralysis and under threat of a military coup, and even civil war.
Even if the government had had more grip on itself and on political power, it was extremely uncertain whether it would have the support of the police, 22 Political Leadership in France gendarmerie, and CRS, if the situation exploded, let alone the army, which was threatening to invade its own mainland. It was as if everyone understood the language but had different interpretations of the specific gestures and utterances.
The Algiers events seemed immediately readable — once again, force was being used to move against a weak regime. The nearest parallel seemed to be 6 February In this case of course, the Mediterranean would have to be crossed, although this too almost happened. And the Rousseauist notion of an all-embracing General Will underpins French republicanism — distinguishing it from other forms of democracy.
In many ways, this is where legitimacy lies The Gaullist Settlement and French Politics 23 in the French political imagination, and this in all ideologies; and if one bears this in mind, we can see that a great deal of the manoeuvring, the claims, the mises en garde, the reassurances, and so on made by each and all between 13 May and 1 June are actually about unity as opposed to division, or rather claims to legitimacy in the name of unity.
This was the aim: that effective politics was to be the expression of an all embracing mythical national unity. Parisian political legitimacy.
https://roacapringliver.tk The representatives of the former were almost illegal but not quite totally; the latter almost incapable of action and without authority. De Gaulle was therefore not a republican in the classic or received sense, but was no less committed to the republic for that, in that republicanism, the overwhelming choice of the French at this moment of history, was necessary to his being on the side of unity. And it is this personally envisioned notion of unity that would inform the republic henceforth and become the essential condition of its strength. We can add that this is an extraordinary political phenomenon — a person who, in a crisis, refuses to condemn or endorse either side almost an imperative in crises and who posits himself as the transcendent site of legitimacy.
This will become the true source of legitimacy of the new republic. In the almost empty space opened up to symbolic politics in May , rhetoric became crucially important, and then a major feature of the new republic. It is the discourse and rhetoric of individuals, echoing, interpolating, bringing onto the scene, the mythologies of unity, greatness, strength, happiness, extraordinary and exemplary leadership, and so on, in dramatic and arresting ways, that become, in part, the currency of the new republic.